Abstract
Introduction
In 1984, Shamir [1] proposed the concept of identity (ID)-based cryptographic system to simplify certificate management. In the ID-based cryptographic system, a user's public key is derived directly from the user's identity information without a certificate. The security of Shamir's ID-based cryptographic system is based on the integer factorization problem. In 2001, Boneh and Franklin [2, 3] proposed an ID-based encryption scheme based on bilinear maps (pairings) defined on elliptic curves. With the advent of bilinear pairings defined on elliptic curves, many ID-based cryptographic schemes with bilinear pairings were proposed [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] .
Many group-oriented applications and multicast communication [13, 14] often need to verify which group members have sent/received a message. This functionality can be achieved by a signature scheme. However, individual verification of signed messages for group members would require a significant computation cost. For reducing verification cost, a signature scheme with the ability to verify multiple signatures simultaneously is called the signature scheme with batch verification [15, 16, 17] and it extremely decreases the authentication verification cost for these applications. Multiple signatures with batch verifications could be classified into three types:
• Type 1: Distinct signers sign the same message.
• Type 2: A signer signs many different messages.
• Type 3: Distinct signers sign different messages. Based on Boneh and Franklin's ID-based system [2, 3] , many ID-based signature schemes with bilinear pairings have been proposed [18, 19, 20, 21, 22] . In 2003, Cha and Cheon [21] proposed an ID-based signature scheme which is more efficient than the previously proposed ID-based signature schemes. Recently, Yoon et al. [22] showed that Cha and Cheon's ID-based signature scheme is unable to support some batch verifications. Yoon et al. also proposed a new ID-based signature scheme with supporting all types of batch verifications. In 2006, Cui et al. [23] also proposed another ID-based signature scheme with batch verifications under a different key construction and security assumption. However, in 2007, Chow et al. [24] showed that Cui et al.'s scheme is still suffers from forgery attacks under Types 1 and 3.
Although Yoon et al.'s scheme [22] is secure against forgery attacks under batch verifications, the signing algorithm of Yoon et al.'s scheme increases about 50% computational time than one of Cha and Cheon's scheme [21] . Actually, Yoon et al. ' s signature scheme is a variant of Cha and Cheon's scheme. It inspires us to propose a Cha-Cheon like signature scheme supporting batch verifications. In this paper, we examine twelve kinds of Cha-Cheon like signature schemes and security properties. We obtain an efficient ID-based signature scheme. In the random oracle model [25] and under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption [3, 26] , we show that this new scheme is secure against existential forgery attacks under various types of batch verifications. Performance analysis is given to demonstrate that our scheme has better performance than the previously proposed schemes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The preliminary of bilinear pairings is given in Section 2. In Section 3, we examine and discuss twelve kinds of Cha-Cheon like signature schemes and security properties. In Section 4, we present a concrete ID-based signature scheme with batch verifications. Security analysis is presented in Section 5. Comparisons and conclusions are given in Section 6.
Preliminary
For the details of bilinear pairings, we refer to [2, 3, 10] for full descriptions. Let G 1 be an additive cyclic group with a prime order q and G 2 be a multiplicative group with the same order q. G 1 is a subgroup of the group of points on an elliptic curve and P is the generator of G 1 
Cha-Cheon like signature schemes
In this section, we briefly review Cha and Cheon's ID-based signature scheme [21] . Then, we examine and discuss twelve possible kinds of Cha-Cheon like signature schemes and security properties. 
Review of Cha and

Cha-Cheon like signature schemes
In the Cha-Cheon signature scheme, (U, V) is the signature σ on the message m for the identity ID, in which there are three public parameters QID, P and P pub as well as the secret key DID. By permuting these parameters, we obtain twelve possible kinds of signature pairs of (U, V) and the corresponding verifications as depicted in Table 1 . Obviously, Kind-1 scheme is the Cha-Cheon original signature scheme [21] . In In Table 1 , Kinds 3, 8 and 10 are insecure because an attacker can obtain the secret key DID by computing h -1 (V-U). It is obvious that Kinds 2, 4, 5, 11 and 12 do not have the corresponding verification equations.
In the following, we present that the Kind-6 scheme can not offer batch verifications of Types 1 and 3. Since the verification equation of the Kind-6 scheme is e(P, V) = e(P pub , U + h⋅QID), the corresponding k-batch verification of Types 1 and 3 is e(P, ΣV i ) = e(P pub , Σ(U i + h i ⋅QID i )). It is obvious that this batch verification is the same as one of the ChaCheon original signature scheme. Actually, Yoon et al. [22] have shown that Cha and Cheon's scheme can not offer batch verifications of Types 1 and 3. Therefore, the Kind-6 scheme is unable to provide batch verifications of Types 1 and 3. 
An efficient signature scheme (Kind-9)
In this section, we present the proposed Kind-9 scheme supporting variant batch verifications in detail. The proposed scheme consists of five algorithms. The Setup and Extract algorithms are the same as ones of Cha and Cheon's ID-based signature scheme [21] . We present three algorithms Sign, Verify and Batch verify as follows: 
Security analysis
In this section, we present security analysis of the proposed ID-based signature scheme. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem [21, 26] . In the random oracle model [25] and under the CDH assumption, we will show that our scheme provides existential unforgeability and k-batch existential unforgeability against the adaptive chosen message and ID attacks.
We say the ID-based signature scheme is secure if it satisfies existential unforgeability defined in the following Definition 1. For a k-batch signature, the scheme is secure if it satisfies k-batch existential unforgeability defined in the following Definition 2. ) was also not asked in the Sign query. That is, the adversary A owns at most n−1 secret keys of n identities. If the response of the Batch Verify algorithm is "accept", the adversary A wins the game. The advantage of the adversary A is defined as the probability that A wins.
Security of single signature Theorem 1. In the random oracle model, assume that a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can break the proposed ID-based signature scheme under the adaptive chosen message and ID attacks with a nonnegligible advantage. Then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary C with a non-negligible advantage that can solve the CDH problem.
Proof. In the random oracle model, let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm with a nonnegligible advantage to perform an adaptively chosenmessage attack and an ID-attack to the proposed IDbased signature scheme. By [21, Lemma 1] , it implies that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A 1 with a non-negligible advantage for an adaptively chosen-message attack and given (fixed) ID-attack. Now we want to construct an adversary C to solve the CDHP by using A 1 . We assume that the algorithm C receives a random instance (P, aP, bP) in G 1 for some a, b ∈ Z q * and he wants to compute abP. Without loss of generality, we refer the given ID to the identity ID U of the user U and let QID U = b⋅P and P pub = aP. The algorithm C plays the challenger in the game defined in Definition 1 and answers the queries of A 1 .
Assume that A 1 can output a valid signature tuple (ID U , m, σ = (U, V) ) with a non-negligible advantage. Following the Forking Lemma in [27] , this lemma adopts the "oracle replay attack" using a polynomial replay of the attack with the same random tape and a different oracle. A 1 can output two valid signature tuples (ID U , m, σ = (U, V)) and (ID U , m, σ′ = (U, V′)) such that e(P, V) = e(U + h ⋅P pub , QID U ) and e(P, V′) = e(U + h′⋅P pub , QID U ), where h and h′ are two hash values from H 1 query.
Since P pub = a⋅P and QID U = b⋅P for the H G query, we have V = bU + habP and V′ = bU + h′abP. Then the adversary C can easily obtain abP = (V-V′)/(h-h′). This is a contradiction for the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. □
Security of k-batch signature for Type 2
In this subsection, we consider the security of kbatch ID-based signature for Type 2. Since each signer's identity of Type 2 is the same, we can use Lemma 1 in [21] to reduce this problem to the variant: the k-batch ID-based signature scheme offers k-batch existential unforgeability against the adaptive chosenmessage and the given ID attacks. It is obvious that k-batch signature of Type 1 is the sub-case of Type 3. Hence, we only need to prove the security of k-batch signature of Type 3. Proof. Without loss of generality, let the identity of these distinct signers be ID i for i = 1, 2, ..., n. By Definition 2 in Subsection 5.1, an adversary owns at most n-1 secret keys of n signers.
Assume that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can forge a k-batch signature of Type 3 for an adaptively chosen message and ID attacks with a non-negligible advantage. By Lemma 2 in [22] , we may construct another algorithm A 1 that can forge a k-batch signature of Type 3 for the adaptively chosen message and the given ID attacks. Now we want to construct an adversary C to solve the CDHP by using A 1 . Note that there exists at least one index i such that the ID i was not asked in the Extract query. Here, we fix a target identity ID 1 . That is, the adversary C knows secret keys DID i , for i=2, 3, …, n, but C doesn't know the secret key DID 1 of the target identity ID 1 . Without loss of generality, given a CDHP tuple (P, aP, bP) for some a, b ∈ Z q * and the fixed identity ID 1 , the adversary C sets P pub = aP and QID 1 =bP.
Assume that the adversary A 1 can forge a valid kbatch signature F 1 = {ST 1 ,…, ST n }, where
the Forking Lemma [27] , the adversary C can obtain another valid k-batch signature F 2 = {ST′ 1 ,…, ST′ n′ }, where ST′ j = (ID′ j , m′ j , σ′ j = (U′ j , V′ j )) for j = 1, 2, …, n′ and n′ ≤ k. Since the random integer r in the Sign phase can be fixed before the hash queries H G and H 1 , here we may assume that the random integer r is used to generate the corresponding signature for ID 1 and h 1 ≠ h′ 1 . That is, we have U i =U′ j and ID i = ID′ j = ID 1 for some i∈{1, 2, …, n } and j∈{1, 2, …, n′}. By the H G query, the adversary C knows each x i of QID i =x i P, for i=2, 3, …, n. At the same reason, the adversary C also knows each x′ j of QID′ j =x′ j P, for j=2, 3, …, n′. But C doesn't know the value b of QID 1 = bP. Meanwhile, the adversary C knows the secret keys DID i , for i=2, 3, …, n, but C doesn't know the secret key DID 1 of the target identity ID 1 . Therefore, we have 
As a result, we obtain the secret key DID 1 = (V 1 -V' 1 )/(h 1 -h′ 1 ). Since P pub = aP and QID 1 =bP, the secret key h′ 1 ) is the CDHP solution. □
Comparisons and conclusions
Here, we use the following notations to analysis the computational cost of Cha-Cheon like ID-based signature schemes.
• TG e : The time of executing the bilinear map operation e.
• TG mul : The time of executing scalar multiplication of points operation.
• TG H : The time of executing the hash function H G ( ).
• TG add : The time of executing addition of points.
• T H : The time of executing the hash function H 1 ( ).
Note that some trivial operations such as modular addition and modular multiplication in Z q are omitted here. Table 2 presents comparisons among some ChaCheon like ID-based signature schemes supporting batch verifications in terms of the computational costs for signing as well as variant batch verifications. In which, Kind-1 is the original Cha-Cheon scheme [21] , Kind-7 is Yoon et al.'s scheme [22] , and the proposed scheme is Kind-9. It is easy to see that the signing algorithm of Kind-9 scheme has the same computational time with one of Cha and Cheon's scheme. However, Cha and Cheon's scheme do not offer batch verifications for multiple signatures. Their scheme suffers from forgery attacks. Moreover, the computational time of the signing algorithm for Yoon et al.'s scheme is increased about 50% than one of the Kind-9 scheme. Hence, the proposed scheme (Kind-9) has the best performance as compared to the previously proposed ID-based signature scheme supporting variant batch verifications. 
